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Abstract
This paper provides a diagnosis of the causes of the California electricity crisis, the
impact of actions taken by state and federal regulators in response to the crisis, and of those that
ultimately ended the crisis.  A necessary first step in understanding the causes of the crisis is a
clear understanding of the federal and state regulatory infrastructure that governs the U.S.
electricity supply industry.  I then discuss the conditions in the western U.S. electricity supply
industry that enabled the California crisis to occur.  The paper then describes the important
regulatory decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that allowed what
was a solvable problem in late summer of 2000 to develop into a full-fledged economic disaster
during the latter part of 2000.  I will also discuss the actions taken at the state and federal level
that ultimately stabilized the California electricity market.  This is followed by a discussion of
what I believe are the major lessons for electricity market design that should be learned from the
California crisis.  The paper concludes with recommendations for how FERC should change the
way it carries out its statutory mandate to set just and reasonable wholesale prices and how state
Public Utility Commissions should revise their retail market policies to prevent a future
California crisis.
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1.  Introduction
This paper provides a diagnosis of the causes of the California electricity crisis, the
impact of actions taken by state and federal regulators in response to the crisis, and those that
ultimately ended the crisis.  The main point of this paper is that the California electricity crisis
was fundamentally a regulatory crisis rather than an economic crisis.  It is also important to
emphasize that a number of conditions in California electricity supply industry discussed below
contributed to the events that occurred during the summer 2000.  However, it is difficult to see
how the market meltdown that occurred in the late 2000 and during the first six months 2001
could have occurred without a significant lapse in wholesale market regulatory oversight and
several ill-conceived responses to events in California during the period June 2000 to June 2001
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
The most important lesson from the California crisis relates to how FERC carries out its
statutory mandate under the Federal Power Act of 1935 to set just and reasonable wholesale
prices in a market regime.  There are a number of important lessons for governments and public
utilities commissions (PUCs) in states that have already formed wholesale electricity markets and
those that are currently considering forming these markets.  Because FERC has recently issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) outlining a standard market design (SMD) that it would
like the entire United States to adopt, it essential that FERC and the state PUCs learn the correct
lessons from this regulatory failure.  Otherwise, it is very likely that these standard market rules,
combined with the retail market rules implemented by state PUCs will increase the likelihood of
future regulatory failures like the California electricity crisis.
A correct diagnosis of the California crisis requires a clear understanding of the federal and
state regulatory infrastructure that governs the U.S. electricity supply industry.  Many observers
fail to recognize that wholesale electricity prices are subject to a much tighter performance
standard than are the prices for virtually all other products.  Consequently, they miss this key
explanatory factor in the California electricity crisis.  The retail market policy of the California
PUC (CPUC) is the second key explanatory factor.  I will describe the important inconsistencies
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between California’s retail market policies and FERC’s wholesale market policies that enabled
the California crisis to occur.
I will then discuss the conditions in the western U.S. electricity supply industry that
enabled the California crisis to occur.  Another important factor that is often unexplained by
observers who blame the crisis on California’s  “flawed market design” is that for almost two
years, a strong case could be made that, according to a number of standard metrics, the California
market outperformed all of the wholesale markets in the U.S. during the period April 1998 to
April 2000.  This paper will provide an explanation for these first two years of market outcomes
and discuss the conditions that enabled the events of the summer of 2000 to occur.
I will then describe and analyze several regulatory decisions by FERC that allowed a
manageable problem to develop into an economic disaster during the latter part of 2000.  As part
of this discussion of FERC’s response to the events of the summer of 2000, I will provide
evidence to dispel a number of the misconceptions that circulated beginning in the late summer of
2000 about the causes and consequences of the California electricity crisis.  It is important to
clarify the factors that led to the summer of 2000, because a number of apparent misconceptions
about conditions in the California were used to justify FERC’s inactivity during the late summer
and autumn of 2000, as well as the ill-conceived remedies it implemented in December of 2000. 
A number of factors suggest that these remedies directly led to the economic disaster of early
2001, when all three investor-owned in California threatened bankruptcy, with one eventually
declaring bankruptcy, and wholesale electricity prices and natural gas prices rose to
unprecedented levels.
I will then discuss the actions taken at the state and federal level that ultimately stabilized
the California electricity market.  This is followed by a discussion of what I believe are the major
lessons for electricity market design that should be learned from the California crisis.  The paper
concludes with recommendations for how FERC should change the way it carries out it statutory
mandate to set just and reasonable wholesale prices and how state PUCs should revise their retail
market policies to prevent a future California crisis.  In this discussion, I describe a worst-case
scenario for how another California electricity crisis could occur if these recommendations are not
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followed.  Unfortunately, only a few states appear to be moving forward with plans to make
their retail market policies consistent with a workably competitive wholesale market.
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2.  Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis
For the most part, market participants in California behaved exactly as one would predict,
given the federal and state regulatory processes and wholesale market incentives they faced.  The
unilateral actions of privately-owned suppliers to maximize the profits they earn from selling
wholesale power, government-owned entities to minimize the costs of supplying their captive
customers, and privately-owned retailers to maximize the profits they earn from selling
electricity to final consumers in this regulatory environment can explain the market outcomes
observed in 1998, 1999, and 2000.  In order to understand the complete set of incentives faced by
these market participants it is necessary to understand the essential features of the federal and
state regulatory processes governing the California electricity market. 
2.1 Federal Regulatory Oversight of Wholesale Electricity Markets
In 1935, Congress passed the Federal Power Act which imposed a statutory mandate on
the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), to set Ajust and reasonable wholesale electricity prices.  An accepted standard for just
and reasonable prices are those that recover production costs, including a fair rate of return on the
capital invested by the firm.  Moreover, if FERC finds that wholesale electricity prices are unjust
and unreasonable, the Federal Power Act gives it the authority to take actions that result in just
and reasonable prices.1  Finally, the Federal Power Act requires that FERC order refunds for any
payments by consumers for prices in excess of just and reasonable levels.
Without a legal mandate from Congress, approximately ten years ago FERC embarked on
a policy to promote wholesale electricity markets throughout the U.S.  Under this policy, the
price a generation unit owner receives from selling into a wholesale electricity market is
determined by the willingness of all generation unit owners to supply electricity, rather than an
administrative process that uses the firm’s production costs and a rate of return on capital
invested.
The just and reasonable price standard for wholesale electricity prices required by the
Federal Power Act presented a significant legal and regulatory challenge for FERC because
markets can set prices substantially in excess of the production costs for sustained periods of
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time.  This occurs because one or more firms operating in the market have market power—the
ability to raise market prices through their unilateral action and profit from this price increase.
2.1.1.   Rationale for Federal Power Act Protection
Spot wholesale electricity markets are particularly susceptible to the exercise of market
power because of how electricity is produced, delivered and sold to final customers.  The
production of electricity is characterized by binding capacity constraints because a generating
unit with a nameplate capacity of 500 megawatts (MW) can produce only slightly more than 500
megawatt-hours (MWh) of energy in a single hour.  These capacity constraints limit the
magnitude of the short-run supply response of each firm to the attempts of its competitors to
raise market prices.
Electricity must be delivered to all customers over a common transmission grid that is
often subject to congestion (a form of capacity constraints), particularly along transmission paths
to major metropolitan areas and isolated geographic locations.  Transmission congestion limits the
number of generators able to sell power into the congested region.  This reduces the potential
supply response to the attempts of firms selling into this smaller market caused by congestion
into the region to raise local prices through the unilateral exercise of market power. 
Finally, the retail market policies that currently exist in most all states, including
California, makes the hourly demand for electricity virtually insensitive to the value of the hourly
wholesale price, particularly in the real-time energy market.  Generators recognize that uniformly
bid higher prices will not significantly reduce the risk that less electricity will be consumed during
that hour.  Consequently, the only factor disciplining the bidding behavior of electricity suppliers
is the aggressiveness of bids submitted by their competitors, rather than the expectation of any
tangible reduction total demand in response to higher prices, as is the case most other markets.
When the demand for electricity is high, the probability of transmission congestion is
usually very high.  During these system conditions, generation unit owners can be confident that
at least some of their capacity will be needed to serve the price-insensitive aggregate wholesale
demand.  These firms are also recognize that any reduction in the quantity of electricity sold
because of high bid prices will be more than compensated for by the significantly higher market
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prices they will receive for all sales they do make.  For this reason, the unilateral exercise of
market power by these firms through their bidding behavior leads to higher profits than they
could achieve if they did not bid to influence market prices.
The time lag necessary to site and construct new generation capacity can result in
substantial periods of significant market power in an electricity market.  This feature of the
electricity industry makes the potential economic damage associated with the exercise of market
power extremely large.  In California, even under the most optimistic scenarios, the time from
choosing a site for a sizable new generating facility (greater than or equal 50 MW in capacity) to
producing electricity from this facility can range from 18 to 24 months.2  This estimate does not
include the time necessary to obtain the permits needed to site the new facility, which can
sometimes double the time necessary to bring the new plant on line.  In California, there are a
several examples of significant permit approval delays for power plants cited close to large
population centers, with the Calpine Metcalf facility south of San Jose being perhaps the most
well-known.   Because of this time lag between conception of new facility and production of
energy from that facility, once market conditions arise which allow existing generating facilities to
exercise substantial amounts of unilateral market power, as was the case in California during the
summer of 2000, these conditions are likely to persist for a long enough period of time to impose
substantial economic hardship on consumers.  At a minimum, this interval of significant economic
hardship is the shortest time period necessary to site, obtain permits for, and construct enough
new generation capacity to create the competitive conditions necessary to reduce the ability of
existing firms to exercise their unilateral market power.
2.1.2.   Federal Power Act Requirements Applied in Wholesale Market Environment
Because of the very large potential harm from the exercise of unilateral market power by
firms in a wholesale electricity market, FERC determined that its statutory mandate under the
Federal Power Act implies that unless a firm could prove that it did not possess market power, it
was not eligible to receive market-based prices.  The supplier could, however, receive prices for
any electricity produced that are set through a cost-of-service regulatory process administered by
FERC.  FERC’s logic for granting market-based price authority is that if all firms participating in
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a market possess no market power will the price set by the market satisfy the just and reasonable
standard of the Federal Power Act.  This logic is consistent with a standard result from economic
theory that states if all firms are unable to exercise any market power, the market price will equal
to the marginal cost of the highest cost unit produced.  As noted earlier, the conditions necessary
for all firms to possess no market power are unlikely to hold in a wholesale electricity market.
Because FERC allows any market participant to receive a market price rather than a pre-
existing cost-based price set through a regulatory process, FERC requires that each participant
demonstrate that it does not have market power or has adequately mitigated any market power it
might possess.  In other words, each market participant must submit sworn testimony to FERC
demonstrating it does not have the ability to raise market prices and profit from this behavior. 
Those generators unable to demonstrate that they do not have market power or have not
adequately mitigated that market power are not eligible to receive market-based rates, but do have
the option to sell at cost-of-service prices set by FERC.
Each of the new generation unit owners and power marketers made these market-based
rate filings before they began selling into the California market and, in many cases before the
California market began operation in April 1998.   Each firm had its authority to receive market
prices approved by FERC for a three-year period.  Because of the timing of the transfer of assets
from the California investor-owned utilities—Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California
Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric—to the new owners—Duke, Dynegy, Reliant,
AES/Williams and Mirant—some of these entities did not begin selling into California at market-
based rates until a later date.
2.1.3.  Flaws in FERC Market-Based Price Regulatory Review
A major source of potential error in determining whether a market participant is eligible to
receive market-based prices is the fact that it is extremely difficult to determine on a prospective
basis if a firm possesses market power.  This is particularly likely to be the case for wholesale
electricity for the reasons discussed in Section 2.1.1.  A second source of potential errors is that
the methodology used by FERC to make this determination uses analytical techniques for market
power assessment based in supplier concentration indices.  Market structure indices have long
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been acknowledged by the economics profession as inadequate for measuring firm-level market
power in other product markets.  The characteristics of the electricity supply industry makes
these indices even less useful for quantifying the extent of market power possessed by an
electricity supplier.
The FERC market power analysis was based on concentration indices applied to
geographic markets that do not account for the fact that electricity must be delivered to final
customers over the existing transmission grid.  The analysis does not recognize the crucial role
that demand and other system conditions, such as transmission capacity availability, play in
determining the amount of unilateral market power that a firm can exercise.3  Most important, it
does not acknowledge the crucial role played by bidding, scheduling and operating protocols in
determining the extent of market power that can be exercised by a firm in a wholesale electricity
market.  Finally, an important lesson from recent research on wholesale electricity markets is that
very small changes in market rules can exert an enormous impact on the ability of a firm to
exercise market power, and this methodology does not account for differences in market rules in
assessing the amount of market power a supplier possesses.  Bushnell (2003) reviews FERC
market power assessment methodology and suggests and implements an alternate approach that
addresses many of these shortcomings.
Besides the extreme difficulty in accurately determining on an ex ante basis whether a
market participant possesses substantial market power, FERC’s methodology for protecting
consumers against the exercise of unilateral market power has an even more troubling property. 
Once a supplier has received market-based price authority it is free to maximize profits, which is
equivalent to exercising all available unilateral market power, because FERC’s market-based price
process has determined that the firm has no ability to exercise unilateral market power.   This
creates the following logical inconsistency for FERC that it has still not dealt with:  It is not
illegal for a firm with market-based rate authority to exercise all available unilateral market power,
but it is illegal for consumers to pay prices that reflect the exercise of significant unilateral market
power because these prices are unjust and unreasonable.  Prices that reflect the exercise of
significant market power are unjust and unreasonable because, they are not cost reflective. 
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Stated differently, according to FERC’s market-based price policy it is not illegal for a
firm to receive a market price that reflects the exercise of significant market power, but it is illegal
for a consumer to pay this unjust and unreasonable price.  This logical impossibility is the result
of an assumption implicit in FERC’s methodology that market power is a binary variable—a firm
either does or does not have the ability to exercise market power.  Unfortunately, as the events in
California and all other bid-based electricity markets operating around the world have
demonstrated, depending on the system conditions, almost any size firm can possess substantial
unilateral market power.  The issue is not whether a firm possesses substantial unilateral market
power, but under what conditions does the firm possess substantial unilateral market power, and
do these system conditions occur with sufficiently high probability that the firm will bid and
schedule its units to take advantage of these system conditions to raise market prices and cause
substantial harm to consumers. 
As discussed in Section 10, protecting consumers from prices that expose them to
significant harm is a more logically consistent strategy for FERC to pursue in fulfilling its
statutory mandate to set just and reasonable prices in a wholesale market regime.  This strategy
involves first determining what pattern of prices and for what duration of time causes significant
consumer harm, and second, specifying what actions FERC will take in response to these harmful
prices.
2.2.   Enabling Retail Market Policies in California
There are two features of the California market that enhanced the ability of suppliers to
exercise unilateral market power.  The first is that the CPUC shielded all final consumers from
wholesale price volatility by offering them the option to purchase all of their demand at a frozen
retail price equal to 90 percent of the regulated retail price during 1996.  This price reduction was
financed by California issuing rate freeze bonds which would be repaid over the first few years of
the wholesale market regime.  At the start of the California market, all consumers could shop
around for lower prices from competing retailers, but at any time in the future they could switch
back to their default provider and purchase at this a frozen retail rate.
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The second enabling feature of the California retail market was the requirement that the
three large load-serving entities (LSEs), Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), Southern California
Edison (SCE), and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E), purchase all of their wholesale
electricity needs from the California Power Exchange (PX) day-ahead market and the California
Independent System (ISO) hour-ahead and real-time markets.  This purchasing requirement was
imposed primarily to administer a transparent mechanism implemented by the CPUC to recover
the stranded assets of the three LSEs.  Under the CPUC’s stranded asset recovery mechanism the
following equation held on a monthly basis for each investor owned-utility (IOU):
(1) CTC = P(retail) - P(wholesale) - P(T&D) - Bond Payments
where P(retail) is the frozen retail rate set by the CPUC, P(T&D) is the regulated price of
transmission and distribution services, Bond Payments is the administratively determined
amount of bond payments used to fund the reduced fixed retail rate, and P(wholesale) is the
average wholesale energy and ancillary services price.  CTC is amount of the competitive
transition charge, or stranded asset recovery paid to each IOU—PG&E, SCE and SDG&E—for
each MWh of energy consumed in their former service territory, whether or not they sold that
electricity to the final consumer.
To implement equation (1) as a stranded asset recovery mechanism, the CPUC needed a
transparent wholesale price of electricity to use for P(wholesale).  If it used the average wholesale
price that each of the three IOUs paid for their power through bilateral transactions, these firms
would have an incentive to negotiate deals with their unregulated affiliates to reduce P(wholesale)
as a way increase the amount of CTC recovery they earned, because on a dollar-for-dollar basis, a
1 $/MWh lower price for P(wholesale) means a 1 $/MWh high value for CTC for that month. 
The CPUC recognized this problem and therefore decided to use the California PX price as its
primary reference price for P(wholesale).  To insure that it was a deep spot market, the CPUC
required all purchases by the LSEs of three IOUs to be through this market.4
In spite of this requirement to purchase their entire load through this spot market and the
ISO’s real-time market, the CPUC did not prohibit the three IOUs from entering into forward
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contracts to hedge this spot price risk.  The CPUC just did not guarantee full cost recovery of
these forward contract purchases.  I also want to emphasize that the CPUC could not prohibit
these three firms from hedging this spot price risk in other ways.  For example, all of these firms
own unregulated affiliates that are not subject to CPUC regulation.  These unregulated affiliates
could have purchased the necessary forward contract to hedge the spot risk borne by the
regulated affiliate subject to CPUC oversight. 
For example, had PG&E Corporation wished to hedge the spot price risk faced by its
CPUC-regulated affiliate, it could have used any of its unregulated affiliates to purchase forward
financial contracts from suppliers serving the California market.  The regulated affiliate could
have continued to make purchases from the PX and ISO markets, but difference payments
between the sellers of the forward contracts to the PG&E affiliate not subject to CPUC
regulation would have hedged PG&E Corporation against this spot price risk.  For example,
assuming PG&E’s load is 10,000 MWh, the unregulated affiliate could have purchased forward
financial contracts for 10,000 MWh at a fixed price from a number of suppliers.  The difference
payments associated with this contract would exactly offset any spot price and CTC payment
risk the CPUC-regulated affiliate might face because the requirement to purchase all of its energy
from the PX and ISO markets.
It is unclear why the three IOUs did not hedge their spot price risk in this manner or even
make full use of the authority to them by the CPUC to hedge spot price risk though the PX
Block Forwards market.  One explanation is that they did not believe that wholesale prices would
reach the level for a sustained period of time so that equation (1) produced negative values for
CTC on a monthly basis, as it did throughout the summer and fall of 2000.  It seems very
plausible that the three IOUs believed that if wholesale prices reached this level, FERC would
intervene and declare that wholesale electricity prices were unjust and unreasonable.  Evidence for
this view is that the average value of the difference between P(retail) and P(T&D) and Bond
Payments was roughly between $65/MWh and $70/MWh, depending on the IOU.  However,
during the first two years of the market, the average value of P(wholesale) in equation (1) was
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slightly less than $35/MWh, which meant that CTC averaged between $30/MWh to $35/MWh,
depending on the IOU.5
Wholesale prices on the order of $70/MWh were difficult to fathom unless one was
willing to assume substantial unilateral market power was being exercised, which would cause
FERC to intervene, or extremely high natural gas prices, which did not occur in California until
very late 2000.  Consequently, as of the start of the market, and even as late as April 2000, it is
difficult see how the IOUs could have forecasted average wholesale prices above $70/MWh for
an entire month, which could explain their lack of interest in hedging this spot price risk.
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3.  Events Leading Up to the California Electricity Crisis
In July of 1998, California’s energy and ancillary services markets experienced the first
episode of the exercise of significant market power.  Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of
this activity took place in the ISO’s Replacement Reserve market.  A generator providing
Replacement Reserve is paid a $/MW capacity payment to provide standby generation capacity
available with 60 minutes notice.  A generation unit owner providing this service also submits a
bid curve to supply energy in the ISO’s real-time energy market if the unit’s capacity bid wins in
the Replacement Reserve market.  Because a generation unit owner providing this service has the
right to receive the ISO’s real-time price for any energy it provides from this reserve capacity,
the market price for this product averaged less than $10/MW during the first three months of the
California market. 
On July 9, 1998, because capacity was withheld from the ancillary services
markets—some suppliers did not make capacity available at any price and others bid extremely
high prices—the price of Replacement Reserve hit $2,500/MW.  In the subsequent days, the ISO
cut its Replacement Reserve demand in half, but these attempts were largely unsuccessful in
limiting the amount of market power exercised in this market.  On July 13, 1998 the price of
Replacement Reserve hit $9999.99/MW.  A rumor circulating at the time claimed that the only
reason the market participant had not bid higher than $9999.99/MW was because of a belief that
the ISO’s bid software could not handle bids above this magnitude.  During this same time
period, prices in the California Power Exchange day-ahead energy market and ISO real-time
energy market reached record high levels.
As result of these market outcomes, the ISO management made an emergency filing with
FERC for permission to impose hard price caps on the ISO’s energy and ancillary services
markets at $250/MW in the ancillary services markets and $250/MWh in the real-time energy
market, which FERC quickly granted.  FERC also directed the Market Surveillance Committee
(MSC) of the California ISO  to prepare a report on the performance of the ISO’s energy and
ancillary services markets.  The August 19, 1998 (MSC) Report (Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro
[1998]) noted that the ISO’s energy and ancillary services markets were not workably
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competitive.  This report identified a number of market design flaws which enhanced the ability
of generators to exercise their unilateral market power in the California electricity market.  The
report contained a number of recommendations for correcting these market design flaws.
In response to the August 1998 MSC Report, FERC issued an order implementing
various market rule changes and asked the MSC to prepare a report analyzing the impact these
market rule changes had on the performance of the ISO’s energy and ancillary services markets. 
The March 25, 1999 MSC Report (Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro [1999]) provided an analysis
of the market power impacts of the re-design of the ISO’s ancillary services markets and its
reliability must-run contracts.  The major focus of this report was whether FERC should
continue to grant the ISO the authority to impose “damage control” price caps on the ISO’s
energy and ancillary services markets.  The MSC concluded that the California electricity market
was still not yet workably competitive and was susceptible to the unilateral exercise of market
power because of an over-reliance on day-ahead and shorter time-horizon markets for the
procurement of energy and ancillary services and the lack of price-responsiveness in the hourly in
the wholesale electricity demand.  As noted earlier, all customers had the option to purchase at
their IOU’s frozen retail rate.  For these reasons, the MSC strongly advocated that FERC extend
the ISO’s authority to impose price caps on the real-time energy and ancillary services markets,
which FERC subsequently did.
On October 18, 1999, the MSC filed a report (Wolak [1999]) with FERC reviewing the
performance of the market since the March 25, 1999 report.  The focus of this report was a
comparison of the performance of the California electricity market during the summer of 1999
versus the summer of 1998.  The measure of market performance used in this report was based
on a preliminary version of the methodology for measuring market power in wholesale electricity
markets described in the study by Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002), hereafter BBW.
This measure of performance compares average actual market prices to the average prices
that would exist in a market where no generators are able to exercise market power.  This analysis
controls for the changing costs of production for generation owners due to input fuel price
changes, forced outages and import availability.  This standard of a market where no supplier
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possesses market power was selected because it is consistent with the perfectly competitive
market benchmark and the standard FERC uses to determine whether a market yields just and
reasonable prices.
Based on this measure of market performance, as well as other factors, the October 1999
MSC report concluded that the potential to exercise significant market power still existed in
California’s wholesale energy market, despite the fact that the performance of the California
electricity market significantly improved during the summer of 1999 relative to the summer of
1998.  The October 1999 MSC report emphasized that a major reason for the superior
performance of the market during the summer of 1999 versus the summer 1998 was the much
milder weather conditions and corresponding lower peak load conditions during the summer of
1999, and the greater availability of imports from the Pacific Northwest in 1999 relative to 1998.
This report also noted that the two major retail market design flaws allowing generation
unit owners to exercise market power in the California energy and ancillary services markets, the
lack of forward financial contracting by the load-serving entities and the lack of price-responsive
wholesale demand, remained unaddressed.  The October 1999 MSC report provided several
recommendations for redesigning California’s retail market policies in order to address these
market design problems.  This report also noted that if these retail market issues were not
addressed as soon as possible, generators would have significant opportunities to exercise market
power in the California electricity market during the summer of 2000.
In March of 2000, the MSC was asked by the Board of Governors of the ISO to provide
an assessment of whether the California energy and ancillary services markets were workably
competitive and offer an opinion on the appropriate level of the price cap on the ISO’s energy
and ancillary services markets for the summer of 2000.  In its March 9, 2000 opinion, the MSC
concluded that these markets were not likely to be workably competitive for the summer of
2000, for the same reasons that it concluded in previous MSC reports that these markets were
not workably competitive during the summers of 1998 and 1999 (Wolak, Nordhaus, and Shapiro
[2000]).  This opinion also summarized an update of the market power measures of BBW
through the summer and autumn of 2000.
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This opinion also provided a prospective assessment of the impact on average wholesale
electricity prices of the exercise of market power for various levels of the price cap on the ISO’s
real-time energy market during the summer of 2000.  Because of a divergence of viewpoints
among the members of the MSC about the increased opportunities to exercise market power at a
higher price cap during the summer of 2000, the MSC did not offer an opinion on the level of the
price cap, but instead explained to the ISO Board the tradeoffs it should take into account in
setting the level of the price cap for the summer of 2000.
In spite of the problems that occurred during the summer of 1998, average market
performance over the first two years of the market, April 1998 to April 2000 was close to the
average competitive benchmark price.  The average difference between the actual electricity prices
and those that emerged from the BBW competitive benchmark pricing algorithm over this two-
year period differed by less than $2/MWh.  The average electricity price over this two-year
period was approximately $33/MWh.
It is also important to emphasize that other wholesale electricity markets operating over
this time period also experienced the exercise of significant unilateral market power.  Bushnell,
Mansur and Saravia (2002) compare the extent of unilateral market power exercised in the
California market to that in the PJM and ISO-New England wholesale markets.  The major
conclusion from this three-market comparison is that unilateral market power is common to all of
these wholesale markets, particularly when the demand for electricity is sufficiently high that a
large fraction of the within-control-area generating capacity is needed to meet this demand.  Over
their sample period, Bushnell Mansur, and Saravia (2002) find that the amount of market power
exercised in California to be quantitatively similar to the amount exercised in the other two ISOs.
 In fact, over their sample period of the summer of 1999, they found that the PJM experienced
the greatest amount of unilateral market power.
Although the performance of the California market during its first two years of operation
compared favorably to the eastern ISOs, there were two danger signals not present to as great of
an extent in the eastern ISOs as they were in California.  The first, and by far most important,
was the lack of hedging of spot price risk by California’s LSEs.  The eastern ISOs had virtually
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their entire final load covered by forward contracts either because of explicit forward contract
purchases or because very little divestiture of vertically integrated firms was ordered as part of
forming the eastern ISOs.  In contrast, California LSEs purchased all of their supplies through
day-ahead or shorter horizon markets.  While is it true that the three IOUs retained ownership of
enough generation capacity to serve between 1/3 to 2 of the hourly load obligations of their LSEs,
this left a substantial amount of their daily energy needs for the short-term markets.
Another important factor is California’s significantly greater import dependence than the
eastern ISOs.  California historically relies on imports to meet between 20 percent and 25 percent
of its electricity needs.  Moreover, these imports are primarily from hydroelectricity from the
Pacific Northwest, and water availability does not respond to electricity prices.  A fossil fuel-
based system can usually supply more electricity in response to higher prices because more
input fuel sources become economic.  In case of hydroelectricity, a supplier can only sell as much
energy as there is water behind the turbine, regardless of how high the electricity price gets.  This
implies that LSEs in California should have hedged an even greater fraction of their expected
wholesale energy needs that the eastern ISOs, because they were much more dependent on
hydroelectric energy.
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4.  The California Electricity Crisis
Low hydro conditions during the summer of 2000 throughout the Pacific Northwest and high
demand conditions in the Desert Southwest left significantly less energy available from these
regions to import into California.  BBW show that the average hourly quantity of imports during
the late summer of 1998 was 5,000 MWh, 6,800 MWh in 1999 and 3,600 MWh in 2000.  This
substantial drop in imports in 2000 relative to 1999 implied that generators located in California
faced a significantly smaller import supply response when they attempted to raise prices through
the unilateral exercise of market power.  BBW found that suppliers to California were able to
exercise market power at unprecedented levels during the summer of 2000.   Using a similar
methodology to that employed by BBW and public data sources on generation unit-level hourly
output, Joskow and Kahn (2002) quantified the enormous amount of market power exercised
during the summer of 2000.  Moreover, they provided firm-level evidence of supply withholding
to exercise market power during many hours of the summer of 2000.
Wolak (2003b) provides evidence that the substantially higher prices during the summer
of 2000 were the result of the unilateral profit-maximizing actions of suppliers to the California
electricity market.  Building on the model of expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior in a
wholesale market given in Wolak (2000), this paper shows that a firm with the marginal cost
curve given in Figure 1 (pg 19) would formulate its expected profit-maximizing bid curve, S(p), as
follows give that it faces two possible residual demand realizations—DR1(p) and DR2(p).  It
would compute the profit-maximizing price and quantity pair associated with each realization of
the residual demand curve.   If residual demand realization DR1(p) occurs, the firm would like to
produce at the output level q1 where the marginal revenue curve associated with DR1(p) crosses
MC(q), the Firm A’s marginal cost curve.  The market price at this level of output by Firm A is
equal to p1.  The profit-maximizing price and quantity pair associated with residual demand
realization DR2(p) is equal to (p2,q2).  If the supplier faced these two possible residual demand
realizations, its expected profit-maximizing bidding strategy would be any function passing
through the two profit-maximizing price and quantity pairs (p1,q1) and (p2,q2).   The curve drawn
in Figure 1 is one possible expected profit-maximizing bidding strategy.  Extending this procedure
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to the case of more than two possible states of the world (or residual demand realizations) is
straightforward, so long as distribution of the residual demand curves satisfies the regularity
conditions given in Wolak (2000).  In this case, the firm’s expected profit-maximizing bid curve,
S(p), is the function passing through all of the ex post profit-maximizing price and quantity pairs
associated with all of the possible residual demand curve realizations.
This logic has the following implication.  Regardless of the residual demand realization,
the following equation holds each hour of the day, h, and for each supplier, j:
(2)  (Ph - MCjh)/Ph = -1/ehj,
where Ph is the market price in hour h,  MCjh is the marginal cost of the highest cost MWh
produced by firm j in hour h, and ehj is elasticity of the residual demand curve facing firm j during
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hour h evaluated at Ph.  Mathematically, ehj = (DRjhN(Ph) (Ph / DRjh(Ph)).  Define Lhj = -1/ehj as
the Lerner Index for firm j in hour h derived from this hourly residual demand elasticity.  By the
logic of Figure 1, it is expected profit-maximizing for supplier j to submit a bid curve in hour h,
Sjh(p), such that all points of intersection between it and any possible residual demand curve firm
j  might face in that hour occur at prices where the equation (2) holds for that residual demand
curve realization and resulting market-clearing price, Ph.  If supplier j is able to find such a bid
curve, then it cannot increase its expected profits by changing Sjh(p), given the bids submitted by
all of it competitors and all possible market demand realizations Qh
d during hour h. 
By this logic, the value of Lhj = -1/ehj is a measure of the unilateral market power that firm
j possesses in hour h.  Using bids submitted by all participants in the California ISO’s real-time
market it is possible to compute Lhj for each supplier j and for all hours.  The calculation differs
from usual approach to computing the Lerner index for supplier that uses an estimate of the
marginal cost of the highest cost unit operating during the hour for supplier j and the market-
clearing price for that hour.  Using bids into the ISO’s real-time market, I only require the
assumption of expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior to recover a supplier’s Lerner index
from the bids submitted by all other suppliers besides supplier j and the market price.  The
average hourly value of Lhj for each supplier for the period June 1 to September 30 is a measure
of the amount of unilateral market power possessed by that firm. 
Although the conditions required for equation (2) to hold exactly for all possible residual
demand realizations are not strictly valid for CAISO real-time market, deviations from equation
(2) are unlikely to be economically significant.  As discussed in Wolak (2000), the market rules
may prohibit the firm from submitting a bid curve that is sufficiently flexible to intersect all
possible residual demand curve realizations at their ex post profit-maximizing price and quantity
pairs.  Figure 4.1 of Wolak (2003a) gives an example of how market rules might constrain the bid
curves a supplier is able to submit for the case of the Australian electricity market.  In this
market, suppliers are able submit up to ten quantity bid increments per generating unit each half-
hour of the day, subject to the constraints that all quantity increments are positive and they sum
to less than or equal to the capacity of the generating unit.  Associated with each of these
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quantity increments are prices that must be set once per day.  In the ISO’s real-time energy
market suppliers are able submit 10 price-quantity pairs each hour for each generation unit,
which affords them considerably more flexibility in satisfying equation (2) each hour than
suppliers in the Australian market.
Using bid data from the California ISO’s real-time electricity market, Wolak (2003b)
computes, ejh, the elasticity of the hourly residual demand curve for hour h facing supplier j
evaluated at the hourly market-clearing price for each of the five large in-state suppliers to the
California electricity market, AES/Williams, Duke, Dynegy, Mirant and Reliant, for the period
June 1 to September 30 for 1998, 1999, and 2000.  Consistent with the market-wide estimates of
the extent of unilateral market power exercised presented in BBW, Wolak (2003b) demonstrates
that for all of these suppliers the average hourly value of 1/ejh was higher in 2000 relative to 1998
and 1999.  This result implies that the ability of each of these five suppliers to raise market
prices by bidding to maximize their profits from selling electricity in the California lSO’s real-
time market was much greater in 2000 relative to the previous two years.  The average hourly
value of 1/ejh in 1998 was somewhat higher than the same value in 1999, indicating that the
unilateral profit-maximizing actions of these suppliers in 1999 were less able to raise market
prices than in 1998.  This result is also consistent with the market-wide estimates of the extent of
unilateral market power computed in BBW for 1998 versus 1999.
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5.  FERC’s Response to the Summer and Autumn of 2000
On November 1, 2000, FERC issued an order that concluded wholesale electricity prices
during the summer and autumn of 2000 were unjust and unreasonable and reflected the exercise of
significant market power.  This order also proposed remedies for these unjust and unreasonable
prices in the California wholesale electricity market.  It proposed replacing the $250/MW(h) hard
cap on the ISO’s real-time energy and ancillary services market with a soft cap of $150/MW(h).
This soft price cap required all generators to cost justify bids in excess of $150/MWh.  If this
quantity of energy or ancillary services was needed by the ISO, then the firm would be paid as-
bid for its sales.  This order also proposed to eliminate the requirement that all California
investor-owned utilities buy and sell all of their day-ahead energy requirements through the
California PX.  In addition to several other market rule changes, this preliminary order required
that the ISO implement a penalty on all loads of $100/MWh for any energy in excess of five
percent of their total consumption that is purchased in the ISO’s real-time energy market.  FERC
also invited comment on these proposed remedies.
On December 1, 2000, the MSC filed comments on these proposed remedies (Wolak,
Nordhaus, and Shapiro, (2000)).  The MSC concluded that “the Proposed Order’s remedies are
likely to be ineffective to constrain market power and, in fact, could exacerbate California’s
supply shortfalls and, thereby, increase wholesale energy prices.”  The MSC concluded that the
proposed remedies would be likely to cause the California PX to declare bankruptcy with little
impact on wholesale electricity prices.  The MSC and the PX’s Market Monitoring Committee,
as well as number of other comments, observed that the Commission’s soft cap would function
very much like no price cap because market participants could use affiliate transactions or other
means to make the cost (paid by the affiliate that owns the generation unit) of providing energy
or ancillary services to California consumers extremely high.  The MSC also argued that the
order’s penalty on load for purchasing excessive amounts of energy in the real-time market would
do little to solve the significant reliability problems that the California ISO was facing as result of
the enormous amounts of generation and load that appeared in the ISO’s real-time energy market,
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given the profitability to suppliers of withholding power from the California market until the
real-time market under FERC’s proposed remedies.
On December 8, 2000 the ISO management and board unilaterally implemented the FERC
soft cap at a $250/MWh level.  This meant that from this date going forward, any generator that
could cost-justify its bid above $250/MWh would be paid as-bid for the electricity they supplied
in the ISO’s real-time market.  In its final order directing remedies for the California electricity
market on December 15, 2000, FERC reiterated its statement that wholesale electricity prices in
California were unjust and unreasonable and reflected the exercise of market power.  This order
adopted its November 1, 2000 proposed remedies with only minor modifications.  Effective
January 1, 2001, when all of the remedies ordered by FERC were implemented, the ISO’s soft
cap was reset at $150/MWh.
On February 6, 2001, the MSC filed with FERC a further elaboration and clarification of
its proposed market power mitigation plan outlined in the December 1, 2000 MSC report 
(Wolak, (2001a)).  This report noted that many of the warnings about the likely impact of the
remedies in FERC’s December 15, 2000 order given in the December 1, 2000 MSC report had
been borne out by the events of January 2001.  The February 6, 2001 MSC report noted that the
average real-time wholesale energy price (the quantity weighted-average price of real-time energy
purchases) during January 2001 was approximately $290/MWh, despite the existence of a
$150/MWh soft cap on the ISO real-time energy market.  Moreover, California experienced, for
the first-time, two days with rolling blackouts due to insufficient generation capacity available to
serve the California market. 
It is important to emphasize that these rolling blackouts occurred during a month when
the daily demand for electricity is near its lowest annual level.  For example, the peak demand in
January 2001 was approximately 30,000 MW.  The peak demand during the summer of 2000
was slightly less than 44,000 MW.  This occurred during August of 2000 when the average price
of wholesale electricity was slightly less than $180/MWh.  Consequently, despite a significantly
lower peak demand and significantly less energy consumed daily, real-time prices in January of
2001 (when FERC’s remedies were in place) were more than $100/MWh more than prices during
Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis 24
August of 2000, the month with the highest average price during the summer of 2000.  Moreover,
the California ISO experienced no Stage 3 emergencies and no rolling blackouts during August of
2000, whereas it experienced almost daily Stage 3 emergencies and two days with rolling
blackouts during January of 2001.
The February 6, 2001 report also described the perverse incentives the FERC soft cap
created for generators with natural gas affiliates selling into California.  This report outlines logic
that illustrates how these firms can use affiliate transactions to raise the announced spot price of
natural gas in California and thereby cost-justify higher electricity bids under the FERC soft cap.
 It also presented evidence that the persistent divergence in natural gas prices in California
relative to the rest of the western U.S. could be attributed to this activity.  Finally, this report
described a fundamental difference in the incentives faced by a generation unit owner in wholesale
electricity markets versus the former vertically-integrated monopoly regime:  the enormous
potential profit increase to generators selling into an electricity market from declaring forced
outages at their facilities.  By declaring a forced outage, a generation unit owner is able to create
an artificial scarcity of generation capacity and therefore pre-commit itself not to provide an
aggressive supply response (because some of its capacity is declared out of service) to the
attempts of its competitors to raise market prices through their bidding behavior.  Under the
former vertically-integrated monopoly regime, the generation owner has little incentive to declare
forced outages because it still retains the obligation to serve final retail demand.  A forced outage
requires this firm to operate more expensive units or purchase power from other firms to meet its
demand obligations.
This report also noted the practical impossibility of verifying whether a declared forced
outage truly means that the plant is unable to operate.  An analogy is drawn to the labor market
where an employee might call his boss to claim a sick day.  It is virtually impossible for the
employee’s boss to determine whether that employee can, in fact, work despite his request for a
sick day.  Similar logic applies to the attempts of the ISO, FERC, or any other independent
entity to verify if a declared forced outage in fact means that the plant is truly unable to operate. 
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By this logic, planned or unplanned outages can be very powerful tools that owners of multiple
generation units can use to exercise their unilateral market power.
In assessing the plausibility of “sick days” a mechanism for creating an artificial scarcity
of available generation capacity, it is important to bear in mind the following facts.  The
California ISO control area has slightly over 44,000 MW of installed capacity.  Consequently, for
a capacity shortfall sufficient to cause rolling blackouts to occur when peak demand is 30,000
MW, over 14,000 MW of capacity must be either forced or planned out.  For Stage 3
emergencies to occur, only slightly less capacity must be forced or planned out.  All of these
calculations assume that no imports are available to sell into the California market.  With some
imports, these numbers must be even larger.  California has over 12,000 MW of available
transmission capacity to deliver energy into the California market, with a historical peak transfer
of energy into California of more than 10,000 MWh in early 1999, so that unless the amount of
energy available to import in California is limited, this use of generation outages to exercise
market power is likely to be unprofitable.  However, these calculations provide strong evidence
for the view that the unprecedented magnitude of forced outages during the late autumn of 2000
and winter of 2001 was due in part to the increased ability of suppliers to exercise unilateral
market power in response to less import availability.  This ability to exercise market power was
enhanced by the remedies implemented by FERC in its December 15, 2000 order that increased
the potential profitability of withholding power until the ISO’s real-time market.
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6.  FERC’s Response to Further Evidence of Substantial Market Power
Despite the growing volume of evidence from a number of independent sources on the
extent of market power exercised in the California electricity market following the imposition of
the December 15, 2000 remedies, FERC took no further action to fulfill its statutory mandate set
just and reasonable prices for wholesale electricity in California for almost four months.  The
average real-time price over this period was more than $300/MWh, even though these months are
typically the lowest demand months of the year.
On April 26, 2001 FERC issued an order establishing a prospective mitigation and
monitoring plan for the California wholesale electricity market that was implemented by the
California ISO on May 29, 2001.  This plan provided price mitigation only under Stage 1, 2, and
3 system emergencies but placed no requirements on the bid prices of generators during other
system conditions.6  Because of the requirement in the FERC order to limit bid prices during
periods of system emergencies, the incentives for generators to supply as much capacity as
possible were significantly dulled precisely at the time when the capacity was needed most. For
many of the same reasons that the soft cap and other market rule changes implemented under the
December 15, 2000 FERC order were ineffective at mitigating the significant market power
exercised in the California electricity market from January 1, 2001 to June 2001, these market
rules did not significantly improve market performance.
In response to increasing pressure from other states in the west as well as California,
FERC imposed a west-wide mitigation plan on June 19, 2001.  This plan set a west-wide price
cap subject to cost-justification similar to the soft cap that applied all western U.S. generation
units.  Moreover, power marketers and importers were required to bid as price-takers, which
meant they could not set the market-clearing price with their bid and would be paid the market-
clearing price for any energy they sold.  This west-wide mitigation measure applied to all hours,
rather than just system emergency hours.  However, the mitigation mechanism only applied to
the ISO’s real-time market, which by that time was serving less than five percent of California’s
load.  In mid-January of 2001, the State of California Department of Water Resources had begun
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purchasing the net-short of the three LSEs, the difference between their total demand for energy
and amount they could supply from their own generation units, though bilateral transactions.
In spite of its laudable goals, the mitigation measure was for the most part, too late,
because as I discuss in Section 8, the State of California had already essentially solved the
California crisis, albeit at a substantial cost to California consumers, by substantial purchases of
forward contracts during the winter of 2001 that began to make deliveries in June of 2001.
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7.  Fundamental Enabler of Supplier Market Power in California
I will now describe the primary factor that allowed suppliers serving the California
market to raise prices vastly in excess of competitive levels during the period May 2000 to June
2001.  When California sold off approximately 17,000 MW of fossil-fuel generation capacity
owned by PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E to Duke, Dynegy, Reliant, AES, and Mirant, the five new
entrants to the California market, it was done without an accompanying provision that the new
owners agree to sell back to these three firms a large fraction of the expected annual output from
these units at a fixed price in a long-term contract with a duration of at least five years.  These
mandatory buy-back forward contracts sold along with the generation units are typically called
“vesting contracts.”   A vesting contract on a 500 MW unit might require the new owner to sell
an average of 400 MWh each hour back to the load-serving entity that sold the generation asset at
a price set by the regulator (before the asset is sold) for a period of at least five years.  There are
a number of modifications to this basic vesting contract structure, but the crucial feature of these
forward contracts is that they obligate the new owner to sell a fixed quantity of energy each year
at a fixed price to the LSE affiliate of the former owner.
Vesting contracts have been a standard part of the re-structuring process in virtually all
countries around the world and in a number of U.S. markets.  Green (1999) discusses the role of
vesting contracts in the England and Wales electricity market.  Wolak (2000) discusses the
Australian electricity market’s experience with vesting contracts.  In the New England market a
number of IOUs had energy buy-back arrangements with the purchasers of the divested units
that resembled vesting contracts.  Although vesting contracts are not essential to the success of a
restructured electricity market, an active forward market where the vast majority of energy is
bought and sold substantially limits the incentive supplier have to exercise market power in the
spot market.  In restructured markets where active forward markets did not previously exist,
such as in countries where the process started with a state-owned monopoly, vesting contracts
are a transition period to an active forward market.  In markets were an active forward energy
market already exists, there is less need for vesting contracts to stimulate the level forward
market participation necessary for a workably competitive spot market.7
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Forward contracts set up an extremely powerful incentive for the seller to produce at
least the contract quantity from its generation units each hour of the day.  The new owner must
purchase any energy necessary to meet its forward contract obligations that it does not supply
from its own units at the spot market price and sell it at the previously agreed upon contract
price.  Consequently, the supplier only has an incentive to bid to raise the market price if it is
assured that it will produce at least its forward contract obligations from its own units. 
However, this supplier cannot be assured of producing its forward contract obligation unless its
bids for this quantity of energy are low enough to be accepted by the ISO.  If each supplier
knows that other suppliers have forward contracts and are eager to supply at least their forward
contract obligations from their own units, then all suppliers will have strong incentives to bid
very close to their marginal cost of production for their forward contract obligation.  This
aggressive bidding brought about by the desire of suppliers to cover their forward contract
positions will set market prices very close to competitive levels in all but the highest demand
periods when at least one supplier is confident that it will be needed by the ISO to produce more
energy than its forward contract quantity regardless of how high it bids.
In contrast, if suppliers have little or no forward contract obligations, their incentive to
bid substantially in excess of the marginal cost of supplying electricity from their units can be
much greater.  That is because they will earn the market-clearing price on all electricity they
produce.  Because these suppliers have no forward contract obligations to meet, they are net
suppliers of electricity with the first MWh of electricity they produce.  To understand this
dramatic change in the incentive to raise prices caused by having no forward contract obligations,
consider the 500 MW unit described earlier.  Suppose this supplier actually produces 450 MWh
of energy.  In a world with 400 MWh committed in a forward contract, if the supplier manages to
raise market prices by $1/MWh, this will increase its revenues by the difference of 450 MWh
(the amount energy it actually produces) and 400 MWh (the amount of its forward contract
obligation), times $1/MWh or $50.  In contrast, in a world with no forward contract obligation, if
this firm manages to increase the market price by $1/MWh, it earns an additional $450 in
revenues, because it receives this price for all of its sales.  In this simple example, the lack of any
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forward contract obligation for the supplier resulted in a nine times greater incentive to raise
market prices by $1/MWh, than would be case if the firm had a forward contract obligation to
supply 400 MWh.  Extending this example to the case of a supplier that owns a portfolio of
generation units, one can immediately see the tremendous increase in the incentive to bid in excess
of marginal cost during certain system conditions caused by the lack of sufficient forward
contract commitments.  The five new entrants to the California market had very limited forward
contract commitments to the three large load serving entities in California.  Besides limited sales
in the PX Block Forwards market to the three LSEs, virtually all of the energy the five merchant
generation companies sold to the three LSEs was purchased in the day-ahead PX and real-time
ISO markets.  Consequently, any increase in these short-term market prices could be earned on
virtually all of the energy produced by these suppliers.
This same incentive for suppliers to raise spot prices in the eastern ISO is limited to
extreme demand conditions, because all of the large load-serving entities in these markets either
own sufficient generation capacity to meet most all of their final demand obligations or have
forward contracts with other suppliers for a substantial fraction of the expected output of from
their units.  Consequently, the exercise of significant market power only occurs during very high
demand conditions, which one or more suppliers is net long relative to their forward contract
position.  This is consistent with the evidence presented in Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia (2002)
presented for PJM and New England, two ISOs with substantial forward contract coverage of
final demand.  Although it is difficult to get precise estimates of the extent that final demand is
covered by forward contracts, estimates for the PJM, New York and New England Markets
suggest that between 85 and 90 percent of annual demand is covered by forward financial
obligations either in the form of generation ownership or forward financial contracts .  In
California during the period May 2000 to June 2001, this figure was close to 40 percent, which is
the approximate average percentage of the total demand of the three large investor-owned utilities
that could be met from their own generation units. 
The very limited forward contract obligations to the three LSEs by the five new fossil-
fuel capacity entrants combined with low import availability during the second half of 2000
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created an environment where, as shown in Wolak (2003b), the unilateral profit-maximizing
bidding behavior of these suppliers resulted in prices vastly in excess of competitive levels.  If
California had forward contract coverage for final demand at the same levels relative to annual
demand as the eastern ISOs, it is difficult to understand how California suppliers would have
found it unilaterally profit-maximizing to withhold capacity to create the artificial scarcity that
allowed them to raise market prices dramatically starting in the summer of 2000.  In addition,
even if the five suppliers had been able to raise market prices, California consumers would have
only had to pay these extremely high prices for approximately ten percent of their consumption
rather than for close to 60 percent of their consumption.
The lack of forward contract obligations to final load in California created a much faster
rate of harm to consumers in California than in other states in the west.  These states only used
the spot market for approximately five percent of their annual electricity needs.  The
substantially larger spot market share in California meant that the same $/MWh electricity price
increase resulted in wholesale energy payments increases in California that were more than 10 to
12 times higher than the wholesale energy payments increases in the rest of the western U.S.
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8.  Regulatory Dispute that Led to the California Crisis
The discussion in the Sections 5 and 6 provide evidence consistent with the view that the
California electricity crisis that occurred in the latter part of 2000 and first six months of 2001
was primarily the result of the conflict between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
the state of California over the appropriate regulatory response to the extremely high wholesale
electricity prices in California during the summer and autumn of 2000.  The state of California
argued that wholesale electricity prices during the summer and autumn of 2000 were unjust and
unreasonable and it was therefore illegal under the Federal Power Act of 1935 for California
consumers to pay these wholesale prices.  However, not until it issued a preliminary order on
November 1, 2000 did FERC first formally state that wholesale prices in California were unjust
and unreasonable and reflected the exercise of significant market power by suppliers to the
California market.  Although FERC reached this conclusion almost four months after California,
the ultimate conflict between FERC and the state of California does not appear to be over
whether wholesale prices in California during the summer and autumn of 2000 were illegal under
the Federal Power Act.  Instead, the ultimate regulatory conflict that led to the California crisis
appears to be over the appropriate remedy for these unjust and unreasonable prices.
As should be clear from the events in California from June 2000 to June 2001, the process
FERC uses to determine whether a firm is eligible to receive market-based prices does not
guarantee market prices that satisfy FERC’s statutory mandate under the Federal Power Act. 
First, the dichotomy implicit in the FERC process that a firm either possesses market power or
does not possess market power does not reflect the realities of wholesale market operation. 
Depending on conditions in the transmission network and the operating decisions of all market
participants, almost any firm can possess substantial market power in the sense of being able to
impact significantly the market price through its unilateral actions.  Second, it is extremely
difficult if not impossible to determine on a prospective basis the frequency that a firm possesses
substantial market power given the tremendous uncertainty about system conditions and the
incentives they create for the behavior of other firms in the market. 
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Because FERC granted market-based price authority to all sellers in the California market
using an inadequate methodology without any accompanying regulatory safeguards, given the
discussion in Section 7, it is not surprising that a sustained period of the exercise of significant
market power and unjust and unreasonable wholesale prices occurred because of the substantially
lower import availability in 2000 and the over-dependence of California’s three large LSEs on the
spot market.  FERC’s remedies implemented in its December 15, 2000 order are more difficult to
understand.  Despite filings by a large number of parties arguing that these remedies (also
proposed in the November 15, 2000 preliminary order) would be ineffective at best and most
likely harmful to the market, FERC still implemented them without significant modification.  As
I noted earlier, in its December 1, 2000 comments, the MSC concluded that the Proposed Order’s
remedies would most likely be ineffective at constraining the exercise of market power and, in
fact, could exacerbate California’s supply shortfalls, and thereby, increase wholesale energy
prices.  Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened following the implementation of these
remedies in January of 2001.  The California Power Exchange went bankrupt, PG&E declared
bankruptcy, SCE came close to declaring bankruptcy, and rolling blackouts of firm load occurred
in January, March and May of 2001. 
As noted in the December 1, 2000 MSC report, FERC’s soft price cap policy contained
in its December 15, 2000 final order amounted to no price cap on wholesale electricity prices,
because all suppliers had to do was to cost-justify their bids in excess of the $150/MWh soft
price cap, something they found increasingly easy to do over time because at the time FERC only
did a very limited review of the prudency of these cost justifications.  Rather than remedying the
unjust and unreasonable prices of the summer and autumn of 2000, noted earlier the December
15, 2000 remedies appear to have produced real-time wholesale prices from December 1, 2000 to
the end of May 2001 that were substantially higher than average wholesale prices during any
preceding or following six-month period, along with the rolling blackouts and bankruptcies and
near-bankruptcies described above.
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9.  Solution to the California Electricity Crisis
I now address the question of the solution to California electricity crisis.  As described
above, the lack of forward contracts between California suppliers and the three large LSEs created
strong incentives for suppliers to withhold capacity from the market in order to increase spot
prices.  By this logic, if enough California suppliers had a substantial amount of their capacity
committed in long-term contracts to California LSEs, the incentive California suppliers had to
withhold capacity from the market would be substantially reduced and the accompanying very
high average spot prices created by this artificial scarcity would be largely eliminated.  For this
reason, the December 1, 2000 report of the Market Surveillance Committee proposed a
joint/federal state regulatory mechanism to implement what amounted to ex-post vesting
contracts between California’s LSEs and suppliers to the California market at fixed prices set by
FERC.  This regulated forward contract remedy was not adopted by FERC in its December 15,
2000 final order.  Consequently, if the state of California wished to purchase the quantity and
mix of forward contracts necessary to commit suppliers to the California market during the
summer 2001 and following two years, it would have to pay prices that reflected the market
power that suppliers expected to exist in the spot market in California over the coming two
years.  Profit-maximizing suppliers would not sell their output in forward contracts that covered
this time period at a fixed price that is below the average price that they expected to receive from
selling this energy in the spot market over the duration of the contract.
Thus, the only way for California to lower the price it had to pay for a forward contract
was to increase the duration of the contract or the fraction of energy purchased in the later years
of the contract.  By committing to purchase more power from existing suppliers at prices above
the level of spot prices likely to exist in California more than two years into the future, California
could obtain a lower overall forward contract price.  However, this was simply a case of paying
for the market power that was likely to exist in the California spot market during the period June
2001 to May 2003 on the installment plan rather than only during this two-year time period.
A simple numerical example illustrates this point.  Suppose a supplier expects that it will
be able to sell electricity in the spot market at prices that average $300/MWh for the period June
Diagnosing the California Electricity Crisis 35
2001 through May 2002, $150/MWh for the period June 2002 through May 2003 and $45/MWh
for all years following May 2003.  Consider a forward contract that offers 1/20 of its energy in
the first year, 1/10 in the second year and 17/20 in years three to ten.  Only if California officials
were willing to pay at least $68.25/MWh = (0.05x300 + 0.1x150 + 0.85x45) for this forward
contract would a profit-maximizing generator to be willing to offer it. 
This example shows that the forward contracts California signed during the winter and
spring of 2001 did not allow it to avoid paying for the considerable market power that market
participants expected to exist over the coming two years when the contracts were signed during
the winter of 2001.  One might ask why the forward prices for deliveries in 2003 and beyond in
during the winter of 2001 were significantly lower than prices for deliveries in the two
intervening years.  This occurred because suppliers recognized that new generation units could be
sited and put into service before the start of the summer of 2003, so the market for electricity
deliveries made after that date is very competitive.  Even during the winter of 2001, existing firms
faced significant competition to supply electricity at time horizons beyond the start of the
summer of 2003 from many potential entrants using combined-cycle gas turbine technologies that
are almost twice as efficient at converting natural gas into electricity as most existing gas-fired
facilities in California.8
During the late winter and early spring of 2001, the state of California signed
approximately $45 billion in forward contracts with durations averaging approximately ten years.
These forward contracts committed a significant amount of electricity to the California market
during the summer of 2001 and even more in the summer of 2002 and beyond.  While a few of the
forward contracts signed during the winter of 2001 began making deliveries in late March and the
beginning April and May of 2001, a substantial fraction of these contracts began delivering power
to California June 1, 2001.  The vast majority of the remaining contracts delivering power during
summer of 2001 began July 1, 2001 and August 1, 2001.
The FERC price mitigation plan described in its June 19, 2001 order was implemented
June 20, 2001.  This plan established a west-wide price cap and required power marketers to bid
as price takers in the California market.  However, all sellers other than power marketers were
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still allowed the opportunity to cost-justify and to be paid as-bid for their electricity at prices
above this west-wide price cap.
To assess the relative impact on spot market outcomes of this price mitigation plan
relative to the forward contracts purchased by the state of California, it is important to bear in
mind the following facts.  First, the FERC price mitigation plan only applied to sales in the
California ISO real-time market.  During this time period less than five percent of the energy
consumed in California was paid the ISO real-time price.  The vast majority of sales during the
summer of 2001 were made through the long-term forward contracts signed during the winter of
2001 and medium-term commitments to supply power negotiated by the California Department
of Water Resources.  Second, according to the California ISO’s Department of Market Analysis,
average prices for incremental energy were slightly below $70/MWh during July of 2001 and less
than $50/MWh for the remaining months of 2001.  Throughout this entire time period the west-
wide price cap was slightly above $91/MWh.  Third, according to the July 25, 2001 Market
Analysis Report of the ISO’s Department of Market Analysis, the extent to which real-time
prices exceeded the competitive benchmark price during the period June 1, 2001 to June 19, 2001
was substantially smaller than it was any previous month during 2001 (Sheffrin [2001]).  The
result is consistent with the logic that the forward contracts beginning delivery on June 1, 2001
provided incentives for more aggressive spot market behavior.  Finally, it is important to note
that demand during each month of 2001 was approximately five percent less than demand during
the same month of 2000, because of significant conservation efforts by California consumers.  All
of these facts suggest that the June 19, 2001 price mitigation plan was not a binding constraint on
real-time prices during the vast majority of hours of the second half of 2001.
Monthly average real-time incremental energy prices from January 1, 2002 to September
30, 2002, the end of price mitigation period, averaged between $50/MWH and $60/MWh, which
provides evidence that this price mitigation plan was not the binding constraint on prices for the
vast majority of hours of the first nine months of 2002 as well.  Average prices for near-term
(forward market horizons longer than day-ahead) energy during the period July 1, 2001 to
September 30, 2002 were significantly lower than average incremental real-time energy prices
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over this same time period.  This result provides evidence that the long-term contracts signed
during the winter of 2001 caused suppliers to exhibit more competitive behavior in the near-term
energy market during this time period.  More recent analyses of market outcomes by the
Department of Analysis of the California ISO which accounts for the impact of the forward
contract obligations of the large suppliers, finds additional evidence consistent with the view that
these forward contract obligations increased the competitiveness of the near-term and real-time
electricity markets during the period July 2001 to September 2002.
Although the above evidence suggests that the FERC June 19, 2001 price mitigation
order, at most, had a very limited impact on the competitiveness of the medium-term and real-
time spot markets for electricity in California relative to the impact of forward contracts signed
by the state of California during the winter of 2001, it did have substantial impact on the
behavior market participants.  Following this imposition of the June 19, 2001 order, FERC
clearly demonstrated a greater willingness to support the actions of the California ISO operators
and Department of Market Analysis in their attempts to restore order to the California market. 
Following the implementation of the June 19, 2001 order, FERC was much more willing to take
tangible actions in support of the ISO’s efforts to make suppliers comply with FERC’s must
offer requirement as well as a number of other provisions of the ISO tariff.  These actions
demonstrated to California market participants that FERC was now taking a far more active role
in regulating the California market.  This more active presence by FERC in California appears to
have subsequently benefited system reliability and market performance.
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10.  Lessons Learned from the California Electricity Crisis
Several lessons from the California electricity crisis follow directly from the diagnosis of
the causes and solution to the California electricity crisis given in the previous section of this
paper.  The most important lesson is that any restructuring process should begin with a large
fraction of final demand covered by long-term forward contracts.  Only a very small fraction of
total demand should be purchased from the medium-term and real-time markets, particularly
given the way that retail electricity is priced to final consumers throughout the U.S.  To the
extent that the wholesale market in a geographic region is highly dependent on imports and highly
dependent on hydroelectric power, the fraction of total demand that should be left to the
medium-term and real-time market is even smaller.  For this reason, the forward contract coverage
of final load at the start of the market in California should have been even greater than what exists
in any of the markets in the eastern U.S. because none of them are as dependent on imports and
hydroelectric energy as California.
The second lesson is that state and federal regulators must coordinate their regulatory
efforts to protect consumers.  Because FERC appears to have disregarded much of the input
from California regulators and policymakers and other independent monitoring entities intimately
acquainted with the performance of the California market during autumn of 2000 in formulating
its December 15, 2000 order implementing remedies for the California market, this order had
many unintended consequences that only made matters worse, rather than remedying the extreme
market power exercised in the spot electricity market in California.  This outcome underscores an
important component of this lesson that is particularly relevant for states that have not yet re-
structured.  State regulators cannot protect consumers from market power in the wholesale
market without the cooperation of FERC, because it is the only regulatory body charged with
setting just and reasonable wholesale electricity prices.  To provide the necessary assurance to
states that another regulatory crisis between FERC and state regulators will not occur at some
future date, I believe it is necessary for FERC to implement a formal mechanism that guarantees
it will fulfill its statutory mandate to set just and reasonable wholesale prices in the most timely
manner possible should market outcomes that reflect significant market power arise in any
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wholesale electricity market that it regulates.  I am extremely skeptical that the national political
process will allow further restructuring of the electricity supply industry unless FERC is able to
provide a greater degree of assurance to state regulators that it will provide the same or a superior
level of protection to consumers relative to what they received in the former vertically integrated
utility regime.  The tremendous resistance to FERC’s standard market design NOPR expressed
by politicians and policymakers in the majority of U.S. states appears to be due in part to the
perception that FERC cannot or will not provide this level of protection to electricity consumers.
An important corollary to the necessity of coordinating federal and state regulatory
policies, is that a successful wholesale market design must take into account the existing retail
market design.  Federal wholesale market polices must be coordinated with state-level retail
market policies.  The details of state-level retail market policies can have potentially enormous
unintended consequences for wholesale market performance.  For example, designing a wholesale
market assuming the existence of active participation by final consumers, when virtually all U.S.
retail markets do not support such participation will not create a workably competitive
wholesale market.  Consequently, a national policy for a standard wholesale market design should
at least recognize that certain conditions in the retail market are necessary to support a workably
competitive wholesale market.  For example, one retail market precondition for FERC approval
of a wholesale market design would be that all customers above some peak demand level, say 200
KW, have hourly meters at their facility and face a default wholesale price equal to the hourly
spot price of electricity at their location.  FERC may also wish to consider preconditions on the
retail infrastructure to support participation by small business and residential customers in the
wholesale market, but some pre-conditions on the retail infrastructure for large, sophisticated
electricity customers is essential.
A third lesson from the California crisis is that FERC cannot set ex ante criteria for a
supplier to meet in order for it to be allowed to receive market-based prices without an ex post
criteria for assessing whether the subsequent market prices are just and reasonable.  As discussed
above, it is impossible to determine with certainty on an ex ante basis whether a supplier owning
a portfolio of generation units has the ability to exercise significant market power.  Consequently,
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I see no way for FERC to avoid devising a transparent methodology for determining what
constitutes a just and reasonable price in a wholesale market regime.  Despite over four years
experience with wholesale markets in the U.S., FERC is still unwilling to define what constitutes
unjust and unreasonable prices.  This FERC policy creates unnecessary regulatory uncertainty
and increases the likelihood of another California electricity crisis, where there is a disagreement
between FERC and state regulators over the extent to which wholesale prices are unjust and
unreasonable and the appropriate regulatory remedies for these prices.  This policy does not
serve the interests of electricity suppliers either.  A major complaint of electricity suppliers at
the present time is that they want to be assurance that any price they are paid will not be subject
to an ex post refund obligation.  Setting an ex post standard for what constitutes a just and
reasonable market price along the lines of the 12-month competitiveness index that is part of the
California ISO’s Market Design 2002 proposed market power mitigation measures satisfies this
goal.9
If one is willing to acknowledge that suppliers attempt to exploit all of the unilateral
market power that they possess and that conditions in the transmission network and the
production and consumption decisions of other market participants determine whether a firm
possess substantial market power, then it follows that a supplier cannot be immunized against
the ability to exercise market power on an ex ante basis.  By this logic, the issue is no longer
whether any supplier possesses market power, but whether the unilateral actions of all market
participants exercising all available market power results in prices that impose significant harm to
consumers.  In other words, do wholesale prices reflect the exercise of a substantial amount of
market power for a sustained enough period of time to impose sufficient harm to consumers to
justify regulatory intervention?  This is the fundamental question that FERC must answer in
order to provide a transparent definition of what constitutes unjust and unreasonable prices in a
wholesale market regime.  Specifically, FERC should be required to define the extent of market
power exercised, the geographic market over which it is exercised, and the time interval over
which it is exercised that results in unjust and unreasonable wholesale prices worthy of
regulatory intervention.  A transparent definition of unjust and unreasonable prices in a wholesale
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market regime that can be applied to any wholesale market considerably simplifies the process of
regulating wholesale markets.  If this transparent standard (that can be computed by all market
participants) for prices is exceeded, then regulatory intervention should automatically occur.
This perspective on just and reasonable wholesale market prices suggests a logical
inconsistency in FERC’s current approach to enforcing the just and reasonable price provision of
the Federal Power Act.  Specifically, in a number of public statements and orders, FERC has
stated that it is important to find the bad actors and punish them for causing unjust and
unreasonable prices.  While it is important to find market participants that have violated market
rules and take back their ill-gotten gains as well as penalize them for any market rule violations or
illegal behavior, these statements by FERC seem to suggest that bad behavior on the part of a
market participant is necessary for unjust and unreasonable prices worthy of refunds to occur. 
However, as emphasized in the above discussion, the unilateral actions of all privately-owned
market participants to serve their fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders and the unilateral
actions of all publicly-owned market participants to serve the interests of their captive customers
can result in market outcomes that reflect the exercise of enormous market power.  In short, there
is no need for any malicious behavior by any market participant for a wholesale electricity
market to produce unjust and unreasonable prices.  Moreover, the Federal Power Act does not
specify that prices must be the result of malicious behavior by a market participant in order for
them to be deemed unjust and unreasonable.  The Federal Power Act only requires that if FERC
determines that prices are unjust and unreasonable, regardless of the cause,  then it must take
actions to set just and reasonable prices and it must order refunds for any payments in excess of
just and reasonable levels. 
The Federal Power Act does not say that these refunds must be paid only by firms that
violated market rules or engaged in illegal behavior.  This is the fundamental logical inconsistency
that FERC faces in attempting to introduce wholesale markets without an explicit statutory
mandate to do so.  Firms can be required to refund wholesale market revenues despite the fact
that no market participant engaged in any illegal behavior or violated any market rule, because
their unilateral profit-maximizing actions jointly resulted in unjust and unreasonable market
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prices.  This means that the legal actions of market participants in compliance with the market
rules can result in market prices that are illegal and worthy of refunds.  I believe the best way for
FERC to deal with this problem is once again to set a transparent standard for what constitutes
unjust and unreasonable prices in a wholesale market regime and set a pre-specified regulatory
intervention that will occur if this standard is violated along the lines of the California ISO’s
proposed 12-month competitiveness index for market power mitigation.  This will minimize the
potential for future FERC versus state regulatory conflict that can create another California
electricity crisis.
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11.  Recommended Changes in FERC’s Regulatory Oversight of  
Wholesale Market
A final lesson from California crisis is that FERC must regulate, rather than simply
monitor wholesale electricity markets.  As should be clear from the previous sections and the
description of the earning warning signs of the exercise of market power in the California market
discussed above, there was no shortage of effective market monitoring in California from the start
of the market in April 1, 1998 to the present time.  The Department of Market Analysis of the
California ISO, the Market Monitoring Committee of the California Power Exchange, the Market
Surveillance Committee of the California ISO, as well as a number of state agencies all
documented the exercise of market power in California.  However, none of these entities had the
authority to implement any market rule changes or penalty mechanisms to limit the incentives
firms had to exercise market power or violate California ISO market rules.  Only FERC has the
authority to implement market rule changes and make regulatory interventions to improve market
performance.  Rather than focusing its attention on monitoring market performance, FERC
should instead concentrate on designing proactive protocols for rapid regulatory intervention to
correct market design flaws as quickly as possible and order refunds as soon as unjust and
unreasonable prices are found.  What allowed the California crisis to exist was not a shortage of
observers with radar guns recording the speed of cars on the highway; it was the lack of traffic
cops writing tickets and imposing fines on cars that exceeded the posted speed limit.
On the topic of the necessity of FERC regulating rather than simply monitoring wholesale
market, I would like to use FERC’s soft price cap policy during the period January 2001 through
June 2001 to illustrate this point.  As discussed above, the soft cap policy stated that if a
generator could cost-justify a bid in excess of the $150/MWh soft price cap, then it could be paid
as-bid for its energy if it was needed to meet demand.  However, regulation that simply says a
firm must justify its costs in order to be reimbursed can yield the same outcome as no regulation
at all.  The recent revelations that energy traders in California misreported transactions prices
during the crisis period suggests that it would be easy for an electricity supplier to obtain an
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invoice for its natural gas input fuel purchase at prices in excess of the actual cost to its energy
trading affiliate.  Consequently, without a rigorous prudency review of how input costs are
actually incurred and disallowances for imprudently incurred costs, there is little limit on the
prices that firms might be able to cost-justify.  In fact, during the period January1, 2001 to June
30, 2001, electricity suppliers often cost-justified and were paid as-bid prices substantially in
excess of $300/MWh under the FERC soft cap policy.  For this reason, anytime FERC caps the
bids that a firm might submit based on its costs of production, it must  perform a prudency
review of these costs and be prepared to disallow any cost that cannot be adequately justified.
A final point related to the importance of FERC regulating rather than simply monitoring
is the necessity of very accurate data on the physical characteristics of plants, input fuel prices,
other input prices and many other aspects of the operation of the wholesale market to carry out
this task.  For example, in order to perform a satisfactory review of the prudency of costs a firm
would like to recover, FERC must have the best available data on these variables.  Moreover, in
order to compute the best possible estimate of what constitutes a just and reasonable wholesale
market price FERC will need, at a minimum, the best available information on the operating
characteristics of generation units, input fuel prices, and the physical state of the transmission
network.  Finally, in order to provide tangible evidence on how well it is doing in delivering
economic benefits (in the form of lower prices) to consumers that they would not have received
in the former vertically integrated utility regime, FERC will need to be able to determine what
prices would have been under the former vertically-integrated utility regime.  This will require the
same information.  Consequently, particularly during the initial transition to a wholesale market
regime, FERC should substantially increase, and certainly not reduce, the amount of data that it
collects from market participants if it would like to be an effective and credible regulator.
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Endnotes
1To illustrate the wide-ranging authority the Federal Power Act gives to FERC to set just and
reasonable prices, I reproduce the following text from the Federal Power Act, “Whenever the
Commission, after a hearing had up its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate,
charge, or classification, demand, observed, charged or collected by any public utility for
transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation,
practice, or contract affected such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate,
charge, classification rule, rule, regulation, practice or contract to be thereafter observed and in
force, and shall fix the same by order.”
2 The California Energy Commission processes all applications for licensing of thermal power
plants that are 50 MW or larger.   Plants smaller than 50 MW are licensed by city and county
agencies and, as a result, may face a shorter time from conception to operation.
3 Schmalensee and Golub (1994) first noted the crucial role played by transmission constraints in
market power assessment in wholesale electricity markets.
4Wolak (1999) discusses the stranded asset recovery mechanism in detail and its impact on retail
competition in the California market.
5 Another explanation is that the three IOUs felt that if wholesale prices rose above $65/MWh to
$70/MWh, the CPUC would be forced to raise retail rates above this level under the “filed rate
doctrine,” which roughly states that any wholesale price that has been filed with and approved
by FERC must be passed through in retail electricity prices.
6 Stage 1, 2, and 3 are various levels of system reserve deficiencies, with a stage 3 emergency
being when the ISO forecasts less than 1.5 percent available reserves on the system or less than
the largest contingency within the service area.
7In this regard, the difference between the origins of California ISO and the Eastern ISOs is
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informative.  The eastern ISOs were formed from tight power pools where presumably active
forward markets had ample time to develop during the power pool regime.  In contrast, the
California ISO was formed by combining the control areas of three vertically-integrated IOUs
that primarily used their own units to serve load.
8 Subsequent events in the California market bear out this logic.  More than 3,000 MW of
incremental capacity (net of unit retirements) has been put into service in the California ISO
control area between the winter of 2001 and the summer of 2003.
9 The April 19, 2002 MSC comments on the ISO’s proposed market power mitigation measures,
Wolak, Barber, Bushnell, and Hobbs (2002), discusses this 12-month competitiveness index and
how it should be used as mechanism for determining consumer harm worthy of regulatory
intervention.
